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One of the main value propositions of Bitcoin is that no matter what, if you pay a high enough fee, a miner in the world will confirm your transaction. In other words, Bitcoin is censorship-resistant. There's a very good reason why “censorship-resistant” is the phrase you hear whenever this topic comes up, and not “censorship-proof.” Any individual miner can censor whatever they want, in the sense that they can refuse to include something in any block they themselves mine. However, they cannot prevent other miners from including this transaction in their own blocks as soon as they find one.
Bitcoin resists censorship, but it does not escape it. Any miner can censor whatever they want, and it is free, ignoring of course the potential opportunity cost of lost revenue if there are not enough transactions available by paying a rate comparable to the miner(s). transactions that he chooses to censor. But that doesn't stop the global system from processing this transaction anyway, unless these miners 1) represent the majority of the entire network hashrate, 2) choose to take advantage of this reality to orphan the block of any miner who chooses to process the transaction(s) they wish to censor.
Doing this would lose the majority of miners committed to the orphan attack money as long as the minority group of miners continued mining the blocks that included the “verboten” transaction. Each time such a block was found, it would essentially increase the time until the next block that enters the chain was found, thereby reducing the average income of the majority of censored miners. This would remain the case until the minority gave up and capitulated or was made bankrupt (since they would forfeit revenue on any block, including the censored transaction).
For now, let's assume that this scenario is not possible. If this were the case, Bitcoin is either a failure or must exist in this state until uncensored miners are able to accumulate enough hashrate in order to defeat the current majority intent to orphan blocks containing transactions that they do not want to confirm in the blockchain.
So what happens when a group of miners, in the minority, decide to censor a specific subset of transactions from their blocks? The amount of block space available for these transactions decreases. They have less block space than all other classes of transactions. What is the end result? Fee pressure for this class of transactions will reach saturation more quickly than for all other classes of transactions.
Just for simplicity in the example, imagine that it only takes 10 transactions to fill a given block. We will call regular transactions simply “regular transactions”, and censored transactions “verboten transactions”. Every day, there are on average five blocks and five miners. Red blocks represent miners who will not operate verboten transactions, and green blocks represent miners who will. For regular transactions to saturate available block space and start driving up fees, there must be more than 50 pending transactions for the auction frenzy to start driving up fees and increasing miner revenue. At this point, the fees were generating revenue for all miners will start to increase.
For verboten transactions, only more than 20 transactions need to be pending for a bidding frenzy to begin among them, thereby increasing fee revenue. But commission income from verboten transactions will only be collected by green miners.
In a situation where verboten transactions do not saturate memory pools beyond the block capacity they have, all miners will earn approximately the same level of income. These verboten transactions must compete with regular transactions in order to have some guarantee of timely confirmation, so if regular transactions are saturating the mempool but verboten transactions are not, the overall fee pressure will be relatively evenly distributed between all minors and no one will incur disproportionate costs. tax revenues are not available to others.
However, if verboten transactions saturate the memory pool beyond the available block space, this fee pressure will increase the fees paid by verboten transactions. only for green miners. Having chosen to censor these transactions, red miners will not realize any increase in revenue from verboten transactions. In this scenario, regular transactions will not have to compete with verboten transactions in terms of fees, unless they need to be confirmed in the next block. Thus, indirectly increasing fees in regular transactions due to fee pressure from verboten transactions will not result in an equivalent increase in revenue for red miners.
This imbalance leaves green miners earning more revenue per block/hash than red miners. In terms of incentives, this is obviously unsustainable. One of two things will happen over time: 1) either green miners will reinvest the additional revenue they acquire and increase their hashrate percentage, or 2) miners will leave the red side and the green set of minors will increase. percentage of the hashrate this way.
This dynamic of higher fees for green miners will cause the hashrate of green miners to grow, whether through reinvestment or defection from red miners, until it reaches an equilibrium where demand for block space from Verboten transactions stabilize with regular transactions, and both groups of miners earn roughly the same income. This balance will last until the demand for block space from verboten transactions exceeds what they have available, then the whole dance of green miners will earn more until they increase their share of network hashrate up to an equilibrium point of equal fee income.
This dynamic explains why Bitcoin resists censorship. Not because not all miners are capable of censoring something, but because miners have an incentive to include something that other miners censor through market dynamics. If some miners censor a category of transactions, they decrease the amount of block space they have and increase the fees they are willing to pay. Pure and simple. Unless miners are completely irrational, in which case Bitcoin's entire security model is called into question, some will include these transactions and earn additional revenue.
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